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Abstract: 
This contribution centres on the practical view of ethics and its connection with the 
philosophy of law as it is portrayed in the works of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. 
According to these two philosophers, ethics determines both the expectations for human 
behaviour, as well as their obligations to society. In carrying out this analysis, I consider 
the function of law and then its regulated function among individuals and the state. 
Thus, I show how the individual’s orientation in the context of society makes an ethical 
statement, determined by humans’ actions throughout their existence. 
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1. Something like a “philosophy of law” by Husserl and Heidegger?
It is undeniable that neither Heidegger nor Husserl wrote a work entitled: “Law” throughout 
their philosophical careers. Given this oversight, philosophical and juridical research has 
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not made much progress in this direction to date. This is due in large part to the fact that 
most interpreters of Husserl and Heidegger’s thought consider the philosophy to concern 
only phenomenology and the notion of being, something that excludes juridical theory 
and much of its practical application.
As a consequence, every discussion of the problem of law, and of its connection to 
ethics in the works of both philosophers, is absent. The philosophical research tradition 
focusses primarily on detecting nationalist traces in Heidegger’s thought, while Husserl’s 
work is examined repeatedly with respect to his philosophy’s genetic motifs which 
correspond to transcendental idealism. As a result, every practical application of both 
thinkers’ thoughts is obliterated. Nevertheless, it is possible to discover a kind of reflection 
in some of their main works, one focused on the meaning of the “law” and its regulated 
function among individuals and the state1.
In order to arrive at the concept of “law” in the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger 
and its use, we might first ask: how is law to be understood and how might it be defined? 
Once these aspects have been clarified, it will be possible to get an overview of its use 
and application, as systematized from both thinkers’ political conceptions. Throughout 
this work I will make reference to H. L. A.  Hart’s The Concept of Law in which the author 
suggests a good way to shirk off the difficulty surrounding the meaning of law, given that 
Hart emphasises the obstacles that come to the fore when one attempts to define the law 
in a permanent or definitive way. The difficulty that concerns the definition of law stems 
from two concerns that Hart identifies as follows: 
1. International law lacks a legislature and compliant states cannot be 
brought before international courts without their prior consent;
2. It is not a peculiarity of complex terms like ‘law’ and ‘legal system’ that 
we are forced to recognize both clear standard cases and challengeable 
borderline cases2.
1 At this point it has to be point out the works of Sophie Loidolt. Cf. LoidoLt, Sophie: “Anspruch 
und Rechtfertigung: Eine Theorie des Rechtlichen Denkens im Anschluss an die Phänomenologie 
Edmund Husserls”. Phaenomenologica 191. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. For the approach to 
Heidegger’s philosophy of law, cf. Massa, Manuela. “Selbstbestimmung und Daseinsbefreiung: 
Annäherungen an einen Rechtsbegriff in Heideggers Frühphilosophie in Perspektive mit Heidegger”, 
Gerhard thonauser (Ed.), in Perspektiven mit Heidegger: Zugänge – Pfade – Anknüpfung. Berlin: 
Karl Alber Verlag, 2017, 147-162.
2 Cf. hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus. The Concept of Law. Clarendon Law Series. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1978, 4
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These remarks by Hart provide the opportunity to underline how the concept of law 
does not follow a standard or something like a “reminder of what is already familiar”; 
instead, its most general feature shows the way according to which some aspects of human 
conduct have to be considered as obligatory3. At this point one might be ask: what can be 
thought of as obligatory in the context of society? What has to be questioned here is the 
mutual character of duties in the form of an individual’s moral conduct. Assuming that 
the problem of law starts from a moral assumption, and that the prescriptions thereafter 
ascribe this to the human being4, then it may be further asked if any moral theory allows 
for the existence of law, as a form of right which incorporate faculties, and which assumes 
a norm allocated by the right of a subject. Thus, the same norms pertain to the subject 
of right5. But the contents of what it considers natural law is different again, and this 
modification depends on those same individuals and upon the historical context to which 
they refer. However, something remains constant in this construction: there are some 
principles of moral behaviour that are unquestionable, even if the norms change6. Hereby, 
the common understanding of the law is renowned in that it can be introduced only where 
there is a society that is based on the relation between free will and the people, in which 
even the union of these terms becomes the subjects of the law7. Hence, firstly it has to 
be point out that the law is used to establish justice through the totality of social rules 
and to guarantee a code of conduct. Furthermore, what is placed on the differentiation is 
between and subjective and objective right. In his book Recht, contemporary philosopher 
Matthias Kaufmann remarks how it is not possible to find something like a subjective right 
in the Greek, Hebraic or roman classical traditions in the European history of law, because 
ius is understand in the sense of objective regulation of relationship. Thus, what concerns 
the natural right is different form human rights, because these are not compromised from 
time and causality. For this reason, right has to be understood as an objective regulation 
of this relationship, in which the natural law is a certain sense that is different from the 
human right, given that it is representative of a general, valid right8. Until the beginning 
of the 19th century, the philosophy of law mainly concerned itself with examinations 
3 Ibidem, 6.
4 Here we might distinguish between moral and ethical. As Pfordten, D v d. points out in his in his 
Normative Ethik, the difference between both terms remains something linguistically structurated, 
while the moral remains more descriptive. Cf. Vgl. Pfordten, D v d. Normative Ethik. Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2010, 2.
5 Cf. fassó Guido. Il diritto naturale. Torino: Ed. Eri, 1964, 9.
6 Ibidem, 15.
7 Cf. Agnes WuLff, Die Existenziale Schuld. Der fundamentalontologische Schuldbegriff Martin 
Heideggers und seine Bedeutung für das Strafrecht.Berlin: Lit, 2008,6.
8 Cf. KaufMann, Matthias. Recht. Berlin: De Grutyer, 2016, 92.
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of natural law, and accordingly defined the existing rights whereby this concept’s goal 
has always been to disclose the universal validity of the split between existing rights and 
wrongs. 
By analysing the concept of ethics in antiquity, Husserl pursued his legal conception 
by questioning the meaning of objective right, given that he underlines its prescriptive 
character, “to this appertains the condition to be generally valid”9. Although, Husserl’s 
legal argument shows what would happen if individuals together, namely as a community, 
were to realise the general form of rightness. In this domain Husserl questions: what 
would happen if even this became a kind of objective value for each member? Hence, his 
general analysis of the right splits into two possibilities which concern both its application 
[Geltung] and its validity [Gültigkeit]. This is the reason why Husserl problematises some 
specific terms such as judgments, claims and conviction, which appertain to the juridical 
field: his pursuit is solely to ask if these concepts ground the core of a juridical analysis; 
if this possibility exists, then the risk incurred even regards their theoretical assessment, 
something which is indicated by Husserl through his use of “the minimum” [Mindeste]10 
and he is not able, since it refers to general assumption of the right and following its 
presupposition, to clarify its deeper meaning through the application of norms. 
Therefore, every advancement of the recognition testifies to the use of right and, thus, 
what concerns the law has to be understood in connection with the reason against which 
the world of individuals competes, something based only on their ethical/rights principle 
and their persuasion. Therefore, the right cannot be held if there is a suggestion of it 
serving masses of individuals; instead, it has to be recognised from the specific substance 
of values [Gewerteten] and desire [Erstrebten]11.
Something similar to Husserl’s understanding of law can be found in Heidegger’s 
analysis of sociality. However, his employment of legal terms in his early works, in view 
of this collection of laws, differs for two reasons: even though Heidegger’s analysis of 
the term legal is fairly “classical,” since the law covers society through the fundamental 
analysis of existence in the world and is positioned as a legal problem, it is connected 
with the λόγος, which is as a property of individuals12. All this results in Basic Concepts of 
Aristotelian Philosophy; here Heidegger gives a political meaning to both κοινωνία and 
9 Gewiss liegt in der Idee eines Rechts, eines in irgendeinem Sinne Sein-Sollenden, die allgemeine 
Gültigkeit Vgl. husserL, Edmund, Einleitung in die Ethik: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 
1924. PeucKer, Henning (ed. ) Husserliana 37. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004, 42.
10 Ibidem.
11 Ibidem. 43
12 Massa M.: op. cit., p. 2
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λόγος through the examination of Aristotle’s first book on politics. The individuals are 
not isolated, instead they are in a social environment with each other and they are able 
to speak and communicate. This standpoint is connected to Heidegger’s interpretation 
of the Greek πòλις, that represent the concept of state which “arises out of a definite 
being-with-one-another”13. Meanwhile, Heidegger notes that Aristotle sees the “basis of 
the being of human being” in the being of πòλις. But the πòλις represents also something 
more since it is according to Heidegger “the fuller sense” as the “site” of that being as Da-
sein which is the same human being14.
Heidegger’s legal conception can also be found in his analysis of being-guilty, which 
founds a kind of normative pretension. The reason for this is founded on Heidegger’s 
explanation of the violation of law: making oneself guilty can regulate the ownedness 
with one another publicly. Consequently, making oneself responsible, by breaking a law 
as we have thus defined it, can also have the character of “coming to owe something to 
others”15. This does not happen merely through law-breaking as such, but rather through 
having the responsibility for another individual thereby becoming endangered in their 
existence, led astray, or even ruined. In reference to this, Heidegger writes:
This “Being-guilty” as “having debts” [Schulden haben] is a way of Being 
with Others in the field of concern, as in providing something or bringing it 
along […] “Being-guilty” also has the signification of “being responsible for” 
[schuld sein an] - that is, being the cause or author of something, or even 
“being the occasion” for something. In this sense of “having responsibility” 
for something, one can “be guilty” of something without “owing” anything 
to someone else or coming to “owe” him. On the other hand, one can owe 
something to another without being responsible for it oneself. Another 
person can “incur debts” with Others for me16.
Hence, moral guilt is a way of being for Dasein, whereby the violation of law can 
be considered in parallel, as something that results from being when it is exposed to 
consciousness. According to Heidegger, if Dasein takes the entity’s place, then history 
becomes fundamental in this connection, because it is the event in which “we act” so 
that history offers the confrontation in which we are ourselves. Consequently, the basic 
phenomenon of history has its roots in the facticity of what life is. The analysis of debt sets 
13 heidegger, Martin. Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, GA18, 35.
14 Perrin, Christophe, and Brogan, Walter A. “From Metaphysics to the Juridical: Heidegger and 
the Question of Law.” Epoché 19, no. 1 (2014): 87-101.
15 heidegger, Being and Time, GA2, 282.
16 Ibidem, 327.
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the law in relation to common understandings: exemplify the common understanding of 
natural law, so that the human being can see itself in thrown-ness and existence. Another 
way to apply the law is to gain the freedom of Dasein from “Man.” This is only possible if 
Dasein is free and can choose itself. 
The following chapter will focus on the function that the law has: namely, a regulative 
one.
2. The regulated function of the law among individual and state: a way to reach the 
Gerechtig-keit?
The legal position of Husserl and Heidegger seems to go in the same direction: law is 
used by the state to regulate the life of the individuals as a community. Which instrument 
do both philosophers use to give the law this kind of function? There might be only one 
answer to this question: norms. 
In this regard, Karl Schuhmann points out that Husserl considers the state as legitims 
problem: this definition suggests the centrality of the legal analysis in his philosophy as the 
object of phenomenology17. Nevertheless, if this legitim definition pertains to the state 
in the context of the juridical system, then how is it structured? Einleitung in die Ethik. 
Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920-1924 suggests a possible answer to this question. By 
analyzing the ethical, Husserl addresses his reflection to Hobbes Abhandlung über den 
Bürger in her connection with the state18. Hereby, Husserl recognized, in the state, an 
“egoistic” form of self-preservation, caused by the particular historical context in which 
Hobbes lived, namely religious wartime in England. This period was characterized by the 
condition that every individual was against every other. This kind of representation offers 
an image of a broken Europe in which the dominium of egoistical interest was covered 
under religious ideals19. 
The assumed position Husserl’s it not something new in the philosophical juridical 
tradition; Samuel von Pufendorf, for example, referring to the state of nature, accuses 
Hobbes for this description that underlines the state of war instead a state of peace20, so 
he breaks completely with its principle in the Iure naturali et gentium libri octo. Pufendorf’s 
17 schuMann Karl, Husserls Staatphilosophie, Freiburg/München: Alber, 1988, 28.
18 Hobbes, Thomas. Thomas Hobbes’ Abhandlung über den Bürger. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1873.
19 “(...) das zerrüttete Europa in der Tat das Bild des Krieges aller gegen alle darbot und einer 
Allherrschaft egoistischer Interesse unter dem Deckmantel religiöse Ideal”. Cf. husserL, E. : op. cit., 
43.
20 KaufMann, M.: op. cit., p. 7
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understanding of the state of nature seems to be similar to the Aristotelian conception 
of sociality, namely that the individual misses this character of aggression present under 
the condition of war in favor of mutually supportiveness, given from the social context in 
which they find themselves21. 
Hence, Husserl also takes a critical view of Hobbes by considering this kind of aspect 
to be soaked by egoisms, a “dominant factor” in the world, and is convinced that even the 
Hobbesian analysis of the state gives the instrument to access to the ought to [Sollen] of 
the human being orientated accordingly to their rational faculty. From this conception, we 
can gather from Husserl’s thought about social principles by following the prescriptive rule 
given by the reason. Meanwhile, Husserl point out that the Hobbesian ethic is founded on 
the doctrine of the state [Staatlehre], in which the concept of ethical right and its negative 
form are covered from both juridical rights and un-rights: these cover the principle of the 
state with the demand for reason22. This “ideal” reference, namely of Husserl’s thought 
to the Hobbesian doctrine of a rational state, actually gives the individual the possibility 
to discover their voluntarist conception to socialize, even if their life remains subjugated 
to the law itself. The core of this demand is given from the structure of the state: this has 
not been considered according to its casual factual condition, rather it should extract the 
same content of law from reason23. However, Hobbes’ theory gives Husserl the instrument 
by which to understand the prescriptive forms of law as a critique of the state itself. This 
is the reason why there is a correspondence among laws and reason, since laws became 
the instrument through which it is present a regulative function. 
Further, in the Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908-1914 Husserl completes 
his juridical analysis by explaining that a norm does not imply a correspondence with 
human action, because the natural process has to be considered by following the law 
of nature. Instead, the individual’s action is based on the norms, that guides its active 
self24. From here it might also be possible to deduce that the meaning of law cannot 
be reduced from a rationalistic perspective, but it has to be inserted into the context of 
society; by this, Husserl intends firstly a contractual one, as long as it depends on the 
voluntary action of human beings, grounded in their will. For this purpose, people should 
21 roLin, Jan. “Der Ursprung des Staates: Die Naturrechtlich-rechtsphilosophische Legitimation 
von Staat und Staatsgewalt im Deutschland des 18. Und 19. Jahrhunderts”. Grundlagen Der 
Rechtswissenschaft 4. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005, 20.
22 Cf. husserL, E.: op. cit., 49.
23 “Nur muss natürlich der Staat nicht der zufällig gewordene faktische Staat sein, sondern durchaus 
und allein seine bestimmte Gesetzgestalt aus der Vernunft ziehen“. Cf. husserL, E. : op. cit., 49.
24 husserL, E. und MeLLe, Ullrich (ed). Vorlesungen über Ethik Und Wertlehre 1908-1914. Husserliana 
28. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988, 27.
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be able to voluntarily follow their rational considerations and the complexities of this 
process to reach the corresponding evaluations. Through this principle, we might come to 
understand the role played by justice: because the individual’s condition is given through 
a community, on which the same human being as an individual depends, it is fundamental 
for the condition of justice that this involve consciousness of the role of principle and 
rules, which guarantees order in society. Society’s models ground Husserl’s notions of 
justice and peace.
Heidegger is also convinced that justice assists Dasein in reaching his being in the world 
in an authentic way. Nevertheless, the same expression “justice” becomes a fundamental 
word in making the experience of Being, in his reflection25. All of this is already clear 
in the Introduction to metaphysics, in which Heidegger focuses on the word δίκη. It is 
possible to discern its two different contrastive points in his examination, which regard 
both fittingness [Fug] in the sense of joint and structure [Fuge und Gefüge]. But another 
meaning can be found in the word δίκη, one that follows a “juridical moral sense”: this 
second exception, as Heidegger admonishes, means that “the word loses its fundamental 
metaphysical content”. What does all of this mean? The answer to this question can be 
found in the words of Heidegger himself, as he writes 
In all its domains and powers, the overwhelming, as regards its powerfulness, 
is fittingness. Being, phusis, is, as sway, originary gatheredness: the logos. 
Being is fittingness that enjoins: δίκη26. 
Thus, the λόγος means “saying” and not as “ratio”, inasmuch it represents the Being, 
thereby obtaining a juridical meaning, because it designates a way in which the relation 
of the human Being is present with others: in it, the originary unity present in the πόλις is 
subtended27. However, the λόγος is also an object of the right self, as Heidegger underlines. 
The word right acts as a helps-word [Hilfswort] and indicates the question of διδόναιν 
δίκην, so that the problem belongs on the part of the right [Recht geben]28. Additionally, 
that the word right contains a direction, as Heidegger mentions, it represents fittingness. 
This is the reason why there is a discrepancy concerning the results of the experience 
that the individual has of justice: this concerns the juridical and moral terms and follows 
25 Cf. sordini, A. “Il problema della giustizia. Dike e Gerechtigkeit”, in Fenomenologia e società, 
1988, 39.
26 heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics. Nota Bene Books. New Haven (Conn.): Yale 
University, 2000, 212.
27 Ibidem, 140.
28 heidegger, Martin, and schüssLer, Ingeborg. Der Spruch Des Anaximander. Frankfurt Am Main: 
Klostermann, 2010, 182.
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the established opposition29 between the being and the ought to. It might be argued, 
then, that Heidegger interprets the word justice in its original meaning as δίκη, because 
he aims to clarify that it is possible to find a connection with the Being through this word. 
Indeed, it names: “Being with reference to the essentially appropriate articulation of all 
being”30. However, what is the reason why this connection among justice and Being has 
this peculiar meaning? This question leads to questions about the rule of law, because 
Heidegger identifies the knowledge of δίκη “of the articulating laws of the Being of 
beings” in his philosophy. Heidegger exemplifies his personals point of view by using 
Plato’s standpoint, as contained in Republic which proffers that “it is essentially necessary 
that philosophers be the rules”31. The essential knowledge has to be the grounds for the 
community’s behaviour -this is considered by Heidegger as the “order of being” in which 
the community founds herself on its own basis and does not have to adopt standards 
from any other’s order. This is what Heidegger recognised as the “juridical aspect” of 
knowledge, in which “unconstrained self-grounding of historical Dasein places itself”32.
Although, the concept of justice finds a connection with the meaning of νομός in the 
sense law and the πόλις: it is possible to grasp the “originally unifying unity of what strives 
in confrontation” through these terms, as well as its regulative function33. The meaning 
that Heidegger has in mind, something he obviously poses in contraposition with the 
concept of modern law, is characterised by a general form of regulation community life, 
that when gathered, as Christoph Perrin observes, can identify the different citizen in its 
midst34. Heidegger’s word sustained this observation in his interpretation of Anaximander, 
by analysing once again the function of δίκη, as “disposing compliance”. Nevertheless, 
compliance “disposes” and is comprised of two properties that Heidegger identified as 
follows: While one concerns possession because it is a disposal, the other one concerns 
the prescriptive feature of law, because “it disposes of Being by giving the law to Being”35. 
So, it might be argued that the law has a regulative function for Heidegger, because it 
regulates not only the Being of Dasein but also the life of the state. But how might the 
individual live in this system? 
29 Perrin, op. cit: 12.
30 Cf. heidegger, M. Nietzsche. New York (N.Y.): Harper and Row, 1979, 166.
31 Ibidem.
32 Ibidem.
33 heidegger, M. op. cit., 9.
34 Perrin C. op. cit., 11.
35 heidegger, Martin and rojceWicz, Richard (ed). The Beginnings of Western Philosophy: 
Interpretations of Anaximander and Parmenides. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2015, 123.
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The following chapter will focus on the answer to this question. Thus, it will be clear 
how the ethical grounds the individual’s orientation in the world for both Husserl and 
Heidegger.
3. The practical view of ethic: a topological attitude
In which way ought individuals live? This question seems to be central in the philosophical 
reflections of Heidegger and Husserl and it grounds the attitude that the individual 
assumes by living in the world. Both philosophers develop an ethical system founded on 
the conviction that the ethical serves as an orientation in the world. Whether or this is 
something theoretical, that follows the principle the θεωρέω, it does guide the human 
being in his social life practically. Although, is it not common to think of either philosopher 
as “ethical thinkers” in the strict sense, their ethical analysis constitutes a central motif of 
their philosophical production nevertheless. For Husserl, as Ullrich Melle reminds is, an 
earlier phase and a later phase of ethics can be distinguished, with regards to his pre-war 
and post-war life36. The reason given for this is Husserl’s personal experience of the First 
World War which took a heavy toll and involved a great deal of personal consequences 
and suffering. As the protagonist of these event, his experience is reflected in the ethical 
development that can be found in his works. 
The young Heidegger too confronted the First World War and its consequences; his 
thought can also be distinguished in terms of “two ethics”, dating from before and after 
the publication of Being and time (1927). Both ethics are upheld following the same 
standpoint: a moral connotation appertains to the openness of Dasein, which influences 
his action in the world. While in his first reflection Heidegger intended the ethical according 
to its original Greek translation as “Ethos”, a place in which the human being can reside, 
the second moment of his reflection advocated a variety of moral voluntarism, in which a 
moral authority arise founded upon the free and resolute choice of individuals37.  
While clarifying the ethical in Husserl’s work, Sophie Loidolt rightly observes that the 
first attempt of Husserl’s project is to develop an ethic as a guiding principal for logic; 
this is reflected in her division of the formal and material, in a-aprioristic and a-posteriori 
forms respectively38. The logical norms, therefore, correspond to logical acts, while norms 
36 Cf. MeLLe, Ullrich. “The Development of Husserl’s Ethics”. Etudes Phénoménologiques 7, no. 13 
(1991): 115.
37 PhiLiPse, Herman. “Heidegger and ethics.” Inquiry 42.3-4 (1999): 439.
38 soPhie, L. op. cit. 148.
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of value correspond to the values act [wertenden Akten]39. Thus, we might ask how spread 
out the ethic is; well, Husserl’s conception of ethic is founded on an ethical subject. This 
ethical subject is identified by Husserl as “I” [Ich] obtains a self-determination through his 
behavior. Thus, Husserl aims to clarify the way in which this “I” realizes itself; this is far from 
a naive act and considers voluntarism as a pure good, whereby the ambition persists to 
became a “new I”40. De facto, the “ethical-I” defines good-willing [gut-wollendes]. Finally, 
if this reflective judge is at the same time a kind of self-evaluation, then what happens 
to Otherness, the Autrui as Levinas defines it, in this kind of reflection that grounds the 
society? Husserl answers this question again in a very precisely way, because he argues 
that the otherness as I-subjects [Ichsubjekte] and subjects of their “I-acts” [ichakte] gives 
an image of the social morality that correspondents to the I-you [ich-du] determination, 
in which it presents other’s moral renovations and social-ethical effectiveness. This 
“I” is a conscious subject of the moral community and he is active in it41. In this I-life, 
Husserl differentiates three intentional classes of acts, which leak out from the prescribed 
character of reason in the form of norms. Husserl remarks that the intellectual act does 
not incorporate judgmental acts42, but as Ullrich Melle points out, in these classes we 
experienced and know the object in their categorical determination. Hence, in the class of 
feeling acts, we-experiences the value-determination of an object; finally, in the class of 
will acts, it might decide in favor of determinate goals and action43.
Husserl’s post war ethics focuses on the renewal of the individual, from which it can be 
distinguished the dual notions of “wilfully” and the “formed life”44. Hence, his changing of 
perspective, since his reflection on ethic is no longer founded on the individual, -rather it is 
focused on the meaning of community, figure out the subject as a cum-structure, in which 
the individuals are each other togethers. Hereby, practical reason is used to renovate their 
life: this idea depends on the attitude of the ethical individual. 
39 Cf. husserL, E. and MeLLe, Ullrich. Vorlesungen über Ethik Und Wertlehre 1908-1914. Husserliana 
28. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988, 267.
40 Cf. husserL, E. and PeucKer, Henning. Einleitung in Die Ethik : Vorlesungen Sommersemester 
1920 Und 1924. Husserliana 37. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004, 163.
41 Ibidem, 163.
42 Cf. husserL, E. and MeLLe, Ullrich. Vorlesungen über Ethik Und Wertlehre 1908-1914. Husserliana 
28. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988, 295.
43 MeLLe, Ullrich. “Husserl’s Personalist Ethics.” Husserl Studies 23, no. 1 (2007): 4.
44 husserL, Edmund, nenon, Thomas, and Sepp, Hans Rainer. Aufsätze Und Vorträge 1922-1937. 
Husserliana 27. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, 20.
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In a certain similarity to Husserl in his analysis of meaning of ηθος, what corresponds 
to “the Being of human” [Seins des Menschen]45, Heidegger comes back to the Greek’s 
tradition. In line with this, Heidegger shows how the ηθος represents the highest [das 
Höchste] from the human to whom he aspires in the course of its life. Hence, the same 
ηθος is posed as condition for the sense of the world: mutatis mutandis the ethically life 
does not involve such considerations, according a modern meaning as alternative suggests 
to the Greeks; instead, the ηθος shows the compliance possibility of Dasein to exist46.
By referring to Aristotle in Basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy Heidegger 
clarifies the connection among language (through Aristotle Rhetoric) and the meaning 
of the ethical. In the incipit of this paragraph §16, entitled “Das ηθος und das πάθος als 
πίστεις”, we might compare again a juridical referment used by Heidegger to establish 
a contrast among the topic of the ordinary discourse before the court and what it is to 
consider “habitually as object an object of deliberation”47. Hence, as Heidegger argues, 
it might be distinguished among a kind of speech that can be situated on the side of 
the dialogical function of the language (διαλέγεσθαι), insofar as one regards general 
opinion in opposition to general view, while the other, in opposition to this the general 
view, cultivates a definite view for its purpose. So that das ηθος and das πάθος can be 
found only by the first meaning of speech as λόγος. But the ηθος as it was shown, is 
also what examines to the possibility of the Being of the human; so how does Heidegger 
properly intend this word? To answer this question, we might turn to Being and Time. That 
Heidegger focuses on this aspect give a particular indication: What he refers to as formal 
ethics, in turn, operates on the basis of quite different structures, since this justifies the 
guidance of the ontological constitution of existence, insofar as it bears the responsibility 
for its being-in-the-world. Specifically, it is important to capture that ethics in its traditional 
sense still falls under the doctrine of morals. For this very reason, Heidegger distinguishes 
two conceptions of ethics: a substantive and a formal ethics of values, the “unspoken 
underlying” which “are disappointed by conscience”48. By listening to the conscience, one 
loses the substantive ethics of values: when existence hears the call, it mutates into actual 
action that goes up and implies the loss of its meaning.
What Heidegger determined as formal ethics is structured differently because it 
establishes the guidelines of the ontological constitution of existence, insofar as it-in-
the-world has a responsibility for it. If its existence accepts this ethical contour, but also 
45 heidegger, Martin. Platon: Sophistes, GA19, 178.
46 Ibidem.
47 heidegger, Martin. Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, GA18, 161.
48 Cf. heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, GA2, 294
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dictates that this standing ethics can be seen at an existential level, then the consequences 
of this process in Heidegger can be taken out: It is instead about finding out their formal 
settings in the fundamental ontology. 
Hence, it does not come as a surprise that Heidegger considers the conception of 
privation and lack as “already insufficient” of the phenomenon of guilt, what becomes an 
indication of the morality at all, in which the moral good and bad are founded49. So, the 
malum as privation boni50 serves Heidegger to show how only the formal consideration of 
ethic can be followed in order to hold it for moral use, because the human, as autonomy 
essence, is not immediately a Being-good [Gutsein]; instead, he aspires to reach the 
good51. 
That is the reason why one’s “wanting-to-have-a-consciousness” means “taking-over 
of that essential consciousnesseses that the original existential within which alone the 
existential possibility of being good’ subsists”52. The condition of Dasein is to choose 
itself by acting in the world, as Ann Kuhn remarks53; this implies lastly an assumption of 
a certain grade of responsibility by conduct its life. Rather, if the individual finds itself 
in an autonomous field of action, then he develops an ability of the world-folder. So, it 
might be argued that Dasein as “subject” should be interpreted according to its practice 
and theoretical unity. So, just as in the natural law, Dasein wants to obtain the “law” that 
makes it possible to release itself from the inauthentic way of life. 
This kind of analysis develops further in Heidegger’s ethic of “post-Being and Time”. 
Hence, Heidegger poses ethics and logics at the same level, because, “Logic and ethics 
both refer to human behavior and its lawfulness”54. That the ethic refers to the conduct of 
the human hints that it might be practiced to gain the good. In Heidegger’s words “what 
human character and behavior comport themselves toward, is the good”55. But how can 
one intend the good? The good do not found a kind of set of values which are attached 
to the externality of the Being-human, because the risk that might be incurred is that 
using these already establish values will define a code of conduct and is, as Heidegger 
49 Cf. irLenBorn, Bernd. Der Ingrimm Des Aufruhrs: Heidegger Und Das Problem des Bösen. 
Passagen Philosophie. Wien: Passagen, 2000, 79.
50 heidegger, M. Being and Time, 332.
51 Kuhn, Ann. Das Wertproblem in Den Frühwerken Martin Heideggers Und Sein Und Zeit. S.l: S.n., 
1968, 117.
52 heidegger, M. Being and Time, 334.
53 Ibidem
54 heidegger, M. Nietzsche, GA6, 92.
55 Ibidem
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explained, something that “deposits this thing into an empty space”56. Instead, values 
acquire another kind of meaning recognized from Heidegger in the action of human self57. 
The basis for the determination of action is once again the law; this is why “reason” is free 
to give itself and can identify with respect to something moral. The ontological contour 
of that remains being in the world. Heidegger specified that this is not intended as the 
aggregate of being-ness, but it instead represents its order: this is why, in the second 
ethic, it is impossible to talk about a “situation ethic” as something locative. In contrast to 
that, Heidegger tries to develop an ethical view which finds its foundation in liberty and 
the regulation of the world. All this can also be grasped in Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Kant; in it, Heidegger points out that the practical and theoretical reason are rooted in 
the context of the imagination58. In this, it is possible to grasp the sensation of attention, 
and the transcendental structure of the moral self. Although only the origin of practical 
reason, from the transcendental imagination, lends itself to understanding, or at least this 
is how Heidegger has explained it:
Die Achtung für das Gesetz konstituiert vielmehr erst die Möglichkeit der 
Handlung. Die Achtung vor (...) ist die Art und Weise, in der uns das Gesetz 
allererst zugänglich wird. Darin liegt zugleich: dieses Gefühl der Achtung für 
das Gesetz dient auch, wie Kant sich ausdrückt, nicht zur “Gründung” des 
Gesetzes59.
This analysis of Kant serves Heidegger’s explanation that, as Walter Heinemann 
remarks, the human Being has to accept his finitude. This kind of reflection is also the 
way to read the question “What should I do?”, the answers to which result in very many 
complications for a human being which has not satisfied fully his potential in life, since his 
“time” is limited60. However, this cannot be asked about the finitude of Dasein, because 
in view of Heidegger’s analysis this becomes a question of metaphysics connected to 
the (un)dendless of the human being61. Heidegger focuses on this point also means 
56 heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics. Nota Bene Books. New Haven (Conn.): Yale 
University, 2000, 175.
57 “Insofern das Wesen der Subjektivität des Subjektes in seiner Personalität liegt, diese aber 
gleichbedeutend ist mit der moralischen Vernunft, mußte sich der Vernunftcharakter der reinen 
Erkenntnis und des Handelns verfestigen“. heidegger Martin. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 
GA3, 168.
58 Ibidem §30.
59 Ibidem, 158.
60 heineMann, Walter. Die Relevanz Der Philosophie Martin Heideggers Für Das Rechtsdenken. S.l: 
S.n., 1970, 227.
61 heidegger Martin. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA3, 197.
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that to understand his critics of the material critique of value, because the action of 
the human remains of capital importance to Heidegger, since through that the human 
beings as possibility can realize themselves; it is possible by acting in the world to create 
the disclosedness, “da”, in the context of his resoluteness, which is characterized by the 
difference among the theoretical and practical definition of the action itself62. Even this 
action makes Dasein possible -and here we might find a connection with the pre-Being 
time ethic- to realize itself as free Beings able to act in the world.
62 heineMann, Walter. Die Relevanz Der Philosophie Martin Heideggers Für Das Rechtsdenken. S.l: 
S.n., 1970, 229.
